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Thesis

--

The Oririn and

0--

Application of the Doctrine of

Precatory Trusts.

by

Daniel Vincent Murphy.

----

C o r n el 1

0---

U n i v e r s i t y

1890.

Prominent a(,ong the varied fields
enco,

in all systems

of juridical

of jurisp.,.dence, stands the law re-

lating to Wills ana testamentary disposition.
parisons were apt,
the nmnberless

sci-

if com-

i -F the lines of dei.arkation

branches

of

between

the law were easily trace-

able, the critical scrutineer would hardly experience
surpi'ise on learning that the law of VWills has extended
its sphere beyond the scope of any other branch of ler'al science.
Unlike much of the

comon law,

it

grew up from the

civil state and does not owe its inception to positive
law.
uity.

its precise ori£'in is lost in the mazes of antiqTradition, however, reveals,/to us as

the out-

growth of advancing civilization and municipal uprisin :.
and the

The g rowth of wisdom,
gradual

cure to men their

recognition
inherent

igin and groowth of this

the developm--ent

of science

of t: ose principles which serights,

had to do with the or-

division of the

law.

Thus from

the hidden mysteries of aistant ages evolved, like many
philosophic

innovations,this important factor in the

gP.eat mass of the law.
Law in its incipiency was an abstruse science.
From the tiny germ grew
branches

the sturdy trunk,

over ne'i ter'itory

of progress

spiread its

and dropping there it-

see.s

to perm again and overlap new doinions.

Guiaed by the light of modern reason,

and feirtilized

by the metaphysical ingenuity of lawyer and judge, it
has attained that deFree of perfection which the state
of human society demands.
A Will has been defined to be the

legal ceclara-

tion of a man's intentions of what he wills to be performed

after his death.

But a will, in its legal sig-

nification, usually has refei-ence to a disposition of
property to tale effect after death.
Whence does a man acquire this right of empire,
reaching!: beyond his mortal life,
is

no longer his 2

Again we are referred. to the faded

lines of tradition.

Its pages tell

days of the patriarchs,

introduced

us that Wills in

the

were known among the Hebrews and

are evidenced by the '.ritings
Solon first

and over property ahich

f sacred Scripture.

them them into Athens;

Blackstone has written tat

the,

Sir VL.

we'e unknown in Rome

before
itic,
it

the laws of the 1:'.

tables,

question the correctness
is

believed

after

e

of this

to be erroneous.

coeval with the first
Wills,

,ut

in

inent authorstatement,

L n'land

and

Wills were

rudiments of law.

then, concern the uisposition of property

the death of the testator.

While,

as shown,

the

laws governing them are ti.e product of the civil

state,

they have a

which

remote

origin in

that human instinct

loves the acquisition and control of property;
ieont which,

"when kept within the sphere

is the basis of social
i.arks

tie

prop;ress

progress,

a

senti-

of moderation,

but in morbid excesses,

of declension ancL the inci'ease of

crime. "
Property and possession, in the primitive state,
were confounded in one.
fro

property and was

Possess sion was inseparable

the true

test

of ownership.

one could assert a better title than the one
Possession was t hercore
ship.
til

The first

equivalent

to occupy becarme

he abandoned his possession,

to occupy succeeded. him as

ownei'.

in possession.

to absolute
tha

rirIhtful

when in

qo

ownerowner un-

turn the next

Lut slo-'zly this right

ojpossession grew to be a substantive ripht-a-

property

4
iv:

thin,---

the

the owner.

Lord Chief Lawn Eilbert says the change

:as produced by the necessity of the
ducts

of one climate

time;

became necessary in

that

the pro-

others w'iich

were non-productive thereof and from the custom thus
tablished of exchanging,

t1he rir'ht to

eriy gained recognition.
p ropei-t,

of

by the will

which could be t, ansferr,,d

Ds-

dispose of prop-

But before the possession and

became distinct, it will be seen that transfer

could obtain only before death; and the only analogy
to the present disposition by will -:ias the gift causa
mortis.

But then as now, men were hela together by, a,

supernatural power.

Those unseverable ties of hum

afIection which bind all men drew to the death bed of
the Lying man his kincared, aria naturally to them fell
his property, until in time this
fi1,ed and re-cognized rule.
the recofnized right

in the

custom grew to be a

Lastly then in order came
individual

to name the object

of his bounty after his decease.
Among the pr'imitive Romans, the f 11nilia was a species
head.

of modern corporation, with the father as the great
The notable

feature was th-e preservation of the

family compact, and in case of the approaching7 death of

5
the father without la ,iful heirs,

he was allowed to choose,

under certain conditions, a per-son who should succeed
hit:i as heir.
state.

in this we see the modern Will in a crude

Devises were comon amonf- the Saxons as ear-ly

as 1000 A.

L. and probably

long before.

rere practiced by thegn

The ri!iit to itake wills was established

at a very early '_ay in England,, both as to realty and
personalty, but vanished, especially as to the forner
on the incoming; of the feudal system.

But it was au'ain

fully established by the statutes of 32 Henry VIII and
Charles Ii.

The precedents thus gradually developed

among thie great nations of the orient were transplanted
to America by the earliest colonial adverturers and incorporated into our national jurisprudence.
Leaving, after this superficial examination, the
subject of Wills in general, we come to treat of that
narrower division of the subject ahich concerns trusts
created by the use of precatory words.

it is an intri-

cate and subtle branch of the law of wills.
The rules of law generally applicable to trusts
cr ated by deed are inapplicable here, because arbitrary
i ales of construction and interpretation are disrerarded

C

in the attempt to ar'ive at the intention of the test .±tor
A t,:. stator
their

is

presu

ordinary meaning;

cases are,
This is

applied,

in

ed to use words accoi'
technical

rules

constructinF

s-ay,

to

and in

some

the instrarent.

done oiily when the intention cannot

from the general purport of the

infr

instrument.

be rathered
Liberality

of meaning is always periAssible, and if the object which
the testator had in mind plainly appears, technical rules
must yield to the

intention, if the design of the

tator

would be defeated

rules

of construction.

tes-

by the application of arbitrary

•lt is by the viEorous application of this cardinal
rule of construction that the doctrine of precatory trusts
.,i:ich we are to consider,
, we

treatises, and beco-ie
tablised part
A

of the

has found its
contend,

jurispruaence

way into legal

essentially

an es-

of England and Amer-

ica.
The worc!

'Irrecatoryu

meaning to supplicate,

comes froi

or besoech.

are those expressive of desire,
treaty.

The doctrine had its

wish,

the Latin "precoy)',
Precatory words
cota.and or en-

origin w!ith t!±oe first

ap-

plication
It

of the rule of interpretation

may be said

tity

w.hich is

to have Litd a
attached

above stated.

ra,-ote oritgin in

to wills

by t!,e

the

Courts.

sancThe

-"esi'e

of the judiciary to effectuate the intentions

of tie

testatvr'

led to the establishment

(Hill on Trustees,
of property,

The right

73).

once doubted,

of the rule

to ri'ake disposition

had bi,cctne a fixed rule of

lw, and of a sacred character.

It often happens that

a husband and father cheishs unbounded confidence in
the devoted wife who for years has been his c6ipanion
in life.

On her,

first

of all,

his accutw.,ulated property in

he wishes to bestow

i.ts fullest

Lut he has children equally dear to him,
by natural

and

toward whom,

impulses, his generosity is directed.

can his -,-.sires b ,, effected, doing equal
classes?

enjoymient.

A limited estate

How

justice to both

to the wife, with the pos-

itive direction t~lvt upon her deatii the est te -o

to

the children, would be contradictory to that true spirit
o0f confidence which should exist between husband and wife.
It

would wound the sensitive

on discovering that her years

feelings of the true wife
of faithful

services had

failed to win for her the confidence of her husband.

3
Her fidelity would be
It

line of cases

this

is

'ewvrded only by an unjust rebuke.

held to create a
of a wish,

in

'.hich

precatory words are

the words being only expressive

trust,

and construed

to be imperative,

expression beinp held to be only expressive

the mode of
of civility.

Again it v-ay happen that children of tender age
survive the parent--incompetent to manage their own affairs.

It

is

meet and proper that

pass his property to his wife,
quest that she, upon her
dren in obedience to

the husband

with the same civil

should
re-

death, devise it to her chil-

the behest of her deceased husbahd.

Suppose no trust were held to be created in the case
just supposed;

the i-.isplaced confidence

of the unsus-

pecting' husband >ight be ignored by the ungrateful wife,
to the detrit.-ent o- those upon w"-o!: the
iitended to bestow his property.

testator had

To repudiate the doc-

trine under consideration would be to ignore the will of
the testator and while his lips are sealed in death,
his wishes are being grossly violated, because of his
isplaced

confidence.

To form an intellig:ent estii1iate

of how often his confidence is abused, Vie need only refer to the numberless cases in which the doctrine of

-

9
precatory trusts
it

has been invoked,

in

nearly every case

will be found that thie express desires

ceaseu are being impugned,
soughJt

and an observation oi them

to be enforced.

What
trine

of the de-

of

is

t'e

believed to have b>;eu

nrecatory trusts

origin of the doc-

has been circumscribed.

The theory seems to be founded on reason, and supported
by vague yet apparent allusions of many text writers and
jurists.

Nevertheless it may be said to depend for

support upon sentimentality, rather than logical necessity.

Eut the

rule has been ascribed to a different, and

what may seem to some, more plausible, source,

than the

one mentioned, 'hich merits at least a superficial scrutiny in connection with our subject.
In the !'atter of Pennocks estate,
268),

the doctrine was

for the first

enforced in the Supreme

(20 Pa. State,

time sought to be

Court of Pennsylvania.

The

origin, history and application of the doctrine have
received a lengthy consideration at the hands of Mr.
justice Lowrie, in which he referring to
atory words in wills, said:
such ,,oides of expression

"It

is

the use of prec-

unquestionable

-Cefe fonnerly used in

the

that
Romran

10
and English law, in order to create a trust, and it .as
founded on good reason;

but if that reason had passed

away before the settlement of this

country,

then the

rule

which depended upon it was not imported as a part of the
law which

we brought

remains cf any force

from, the mother country.
in

England after

the

has ceased is not surprising, for it
institutions
them,

to outlive .the causes

and thus vea:,.r

a corm,,on fate of
*jhich gave

often the form

he ac,.its the

itaportation

Roman to the D-,rlish law,
in

-'eason of it

survives

rise

but says

of the
it

the constraint of circumstances.

mentatively that

the

"instituted"

Con-

rule from the

had its

origin

hie shrews a *nU.Roman heir

was com-

pelled by accepting the estate of his ancestor to
his debts,

and,

as a

tator's
his heir,

state

of th-infs,

wishes being

,'ntil-ely

others;

and that

the execution of t..e

tes-

dependent on the will of

words of entrea.ty were mo.ve

appropriate

pay all

compensation he could disregard the

provisions of the will which r:ave to
unc er such a

to

the prin-

was thus a signed to express."

ciple which it
tinuing,

That it

than words of cormn and.

efficacious

and

Secondly he reasons

that owing to the o:reat covn:lexity of the Toman Will and

thie strict observance ol' the complex fonmi and conseunent probability of the will being: defeated, a custom

arose

of

'entreating' the heir, by means of a codicil,

to,cuispose

of hi

intentions

in

property accordinr' to his exPl'ossed

t!ie will, if t

e

instr,..t

its-lf

failed

to operate as such in the hands of the law.
This learned writer
port

alludes

of his assertions.

We

by. tradition

substantiatec

su.t,-it that

sup-

they are un-

or the writinrs of authorita-

tive juriaical commentators
It is tra*

to no authority in

or historians.

that the Roman heir" succeeded to the en-

tire legal position of the intestate or testator, but,
says iMr. 1lorey, "The heir is bound to distribute the
property

of vrhich he coves into possession acco 'ding to

the le _'ally exprossed

will of the decedent.

In early

times this duty was absolute, so that after, debts were
paid.,
tirely

the

-.eai ining property of the estate might be en-

exhausted

in

legacies,

leaving nothing in

the

hands of the heir to compensate him for assuming and
administer-ing the estate."
If the debts

exceeded the value of the estate,

the

heir was nevertheless bound to entingusih them.

As

early as the

this

Republic laws we-'e passed to correct

heirs

mon foi

acceased,
To

cies.

the,

enacteu

fileu

in

cidia law was passeca,

in"

t

the right

of c(.nstrliction,

1,_,
oCnes

I.c:

ad finallrhe

estate

after

The

his debts weie paid.

one-fourth enurou to the heir,

fal-

i,.ich prohibited

C.,

about 40 B.

lega-

of the tes-

of hiS

fr'ov. devising more than tire....ur....

a testator
enti.-e

to limit

pu_,pose,

their

the estate of the

the lex fa;'ia and

to accept,

but oxin',

tc uevise,

;Tas com-

\hole mi 'ht be e,,rausted in

induce heirs

lox voconia 'rere
tator

the

to

to succred

to reflse

because

it

to this legislation,

But prior

injustice..

called the

retain1'alcidian

portion.
This p obably served as a

which the heir as u .ed till

ability
ian,

remuneration

;hen he grantea the inventory,
(f

by means of which the liability

the

for the li-

time of Justin-

(beneficid
tc.~

heir

inventari)

was measured

b,; the value of thie est-c te to which he succeeded.
(section 24),
fully

says:

in

the olo times a man might law-

spend his whole patrimony and gifts

anc! leave nothing to the heir
The XII Tables provided:
his are,

so let

Gaius

of freedom,

except an empty name. "

"As the legacies of what is

the law be."

it

thus a1ppears

that the

13
requirement that legacies be uisposed of according to
the terms ;vere not only enforceable,
req-ircu by the

isla'.ion",

'11

Tables.

says iihnter,

the inheriance

".jas

"The

but was expressly
:'osult of this lep-

that hei's held bac.

ana so many men die

f om

intestate."

Aft,;er admitting the imporatiun of the doctrine of
p-'ecatory

trusts

from the Romean to the English law,

IJ

.

Justice Lowrie further incoheren1j

attempts another,

reason foe,

He says that devises

its

were priohibite
;ie 1 'e
able,

recognition there.

durin- the feudal per-iod,

resortec, to instead,

that trusts

and -hese nut being enforce-i

worcis of entieaty 4ere

.-xsorted to.

Without

attempting to eluciuate the histurical inacUaacy uf this
statement,

v-e will unl

aud that

the fabic

of civil-

ized la'a in Enplanc. ,-as woven from shl-eds left by the
Romar

occupation.

invasion,
ian-,saes,
terls.

anu V(iarn
c

To

it paved the

lawis,

.Va; for

the Saxon

bleneu with the rude barbar-

.iprised the Saxon and ea'-ly English sys-

IJote fr'oi.- a le-. neu .'rizer,

of Roman wisdom was ; ansitlea
ians of the aest,

"The

inheritance

to the fierce barbar-

arlia as they wr-ought the ma, -i'ials

the temple and amphitheatre

into theirL

of

o-,in time f-cit-

res,:es anci u,'ellings,
of

purate fr.-agments

so oiu they occasionally inco'uman laws intu
T:ii'

i-;Irnnnce.

,icii-

ho,/ev

'',

uic, unconsciously, at. -'.nr, at i!,ost a ,ainst
b'at ,jhen societ; improvou, ,.n iok.
1 i~siinc

ea~'oai

the!/ sometimes

thai

will,

on tho i'urian law

veneration, :ts the su' est basis of ci-

(Phil~iure' s Int.

vil ouer.

.,v
n unformIu

to Rorn.

Law;,,

p.

ll.1)

'L'itings o& these le
Justly acc Jauiting th. ..
aathors, we contend that

fled

reasons asc,-ibed fur the
rh

insti-.ution of this aoci'ine by the Romans never existea

that at no timo had t-e heil

them;

aaionp

to disi'-erara the t :,'ms of a *ill

the iright

and take his ances-

tor's p-o7-erty as a cotipensation -for 1c liabiliTr
whlich he assumea -fo the payment of .ebts;
the cont;,a'y, he
the

but that,

on

ias bound to observe the directions of

uill in cisposinp: of the property after uebts .'ere

paid, even in cases wihore he , s th'b;
off f:'o~1his

riht

entirely ct

of in-iei'itance.

Lat whateve,' r;. have bcon tile oiigin of the ucctrin ,, ,hete
rilosohe

t,.aceble tu the 1 nius of the stoic

, oe oie lu'aa
o

ina o b- 'ian Saon,

or the homoroneous law of the barbar-ian Saxon,

Evi 'on
conce'ns

us but little now.
ist,

If reasons for sustaining it now ex-

it should be retained as a part of our jurispru-

dence whether they be identical with the original or not,
Perhaps on no doctrine of the English and American
law have more widely different views prevailed as to its
salutary effects.

By some courts and writers fiercely

condemned and utterly repudiated or evaded as a 7art of
the law, while by others of equal eminence, it has reccived laudable commendation.
In discussing this doctrine, Mr. Justice Storey
says "The doctrine of construing expressions of recommend
ation, confidence, hc e, wish, and desire into positive
and peremptory commands is difficult to be maintained
upon a soLund princinle of interpretation of the actual
intentions of the testator.

It can scarcely be presumed

that every testator should not clearly understand the
difference between such expressions
direction and command, and that

and words of positiv e

in using the one and

omitting the other, he should have a determined end in
view.

It will be a ,reed on all hands that when the in-

tention of the testator is to leave the whole object as

16
a pure matter of discretion, to the free will and pleasure of the narty enjoying his confidence and favor, and
when his expressions of desire are entrusted as mere
moral suggestions to excite and aid that discretion, b-t
not absolutely to govern and control it,
guage

then the lan-

cannot and ought not to create a trust".
In Cotton vs same, in the United States TDistrict of

California, 1884, the doctrine received a harsh rebuke
at the hands of the Court

; a testatnr gave all his

prGperty to his wife, and added :

"I recommend to her

the care and protection of my mother".
oninion said :

"It

The Court in its

is urged on the part of the claimant

that in this class of cases, a wish expressed or a simple
request, to the devoted and obedient wife, is equivalent
to a conmand.

This when voluntarily recognized as an

obligation by the wife, in the affairs of married life,
may be a very rroper and s'lutary principle and practice
in marital rolity and domestic etiquette, but
romantic, to largely deficient

it is too

in the sanctions of the

oblivations of r ositive law, too loose and uncertain to
be ado-ted by the Courts as a rule of law, by which
large estates are to be distributed in oprosition to the

17
plain, ordinary, actual matter of fact words of a will."
It is obvious that these criticisms proceed upon an
eroneois view of the reason
rule, to wit
tator.

for the establishment of the

to effectuate the

intentions of the t2s-

"Intention is the nolar star to guide

.s in the

construction of wills", said Marshal Chief Justice, in
Smith vs Bell, 6 Pet. 75

) and as we have previously

shown this is the purnorted universal doctrine.
submit that

But we

it is not observed in many cases where pre-

catory words have been held not to create a trust.
Intention cannot be distinguished from desire, within the meaning of this rule.

"Intention is when the

mind, with great earnestness, and of choice, fixes its
view on any idea" (Locke). What

can be the design of the

testator in u1sing these recommendatory words ?
Is it not a bending of the mind toward an idea, with a
hope that it will become a realization ?

HTe may not ex-

press his intenticns in rositive terms, yet they are just
as apparent and capable of being interpreted, as if he
do.

He fithholds a bold command with a hu.mane regard for

the sensitiveness of those to whom he is dearly attached.
Says L.

d Loughborough :-

"When a person recommends to

18
another who is independent of him, there is nothing inper' tive ; but

if he recommends that to be done by a per-

son whom he has a right to order it to be done, the mode
is

only civility".
If there is any virtue

in the rule of construction

under consideration it should be applied where only the
desire is expressed, as well as the settled intention,
admitting that there is a refined distinction, which
doubt.

A desire is but an immature intention.

leads to the other.

we

The one

A desire rirens into an intention.

If the intention is sacred, a thing to be respected, then
the same

in an embryo state should be held equally sa-

cred as long as n

more fixed or definite purpose appears

As was said by Lore, Resedale,
Lawless, 5 Clark -nd 7in. 12C-54 )

(quoted in Shav vs
:-

"Where a testator

having it in his rower to dispose of his property, expresses a desire as to the disposition thereof, and the
objects to which he refers are certain, the desire so expressed amounts to a command, and if he shows his desire,
FE P! FACT EXPRESSFS HIS INTENTICN, provided the objects
to which he refers are so defined that a court can act
upon the desire so ex-ressed."
This language portrays our meaning.

Starting with

, 19
the hypothesis that the doctrine of construing a will
in

sound,

we contend that,

although
literal

tention may h'ave a different
ing the spirit

of the above

the

intentio.n

,f

the mind,

conviction,

settled
it

is

rule,

A (esii'e

as synonomous terms.

is

inLent ion of the testator,

accordance with the

if

Lhe words

o

desire and in-

:eaning,

yet apply-

they should be constried

of the mind is

in

no stronger desire,

fact
or more

be expressed.

coirmon for judges

of the modern dayito criticize

the doctrine of precatory trusts and comments to the effect that the doctrine should not be extended are frequent.

A careful examination of these cases will show

that the doctrine is as broadly recognized to-day as it
was nearly two centuries ago, and that the discrepanay be
tween the early and modern cases arises not
tion of the doctrine,
but

rct

in

in a repudia-

a narrower recognition of i4

in the narrowness of the application of the rule giv-

ing effect to the intention of the testator.
A comparison of a few of the early with the later
cases,

keeping sharply

in

have pointed out, will, we
sions.

mind the distinction

which we

think, support our conclu-

In the case of Warding vs. Glyn, 468, decided in

1739, the testator r-ave to his wife certain property,

20
but' "desired" her to give it to such of his relations as
she should think most deserving and approve of."

Lord

Iardwike, in considering the case s-id :-

the

uncertainty

is

such that

it

is

"Wphe'"e

im-ossible for the Court

to determine what rersons are meant, it is very strong

to the

as a recommnendation

for the Court to construe it

first devisee and make it absolute to him.

But here the

word relations is a legal description, and this is a de-

vise to such relations and omerates as a trust in

the

"The ,ife having failed to execute the will ac-

wife.

cording to the trust, the Court distributed it under the
Statute of distributions, remarking that
virtue of the
by"

in

wife,

bit

statute"

that

it

executiiig the discretioary
she having

inored

it was not

"b,7

was a"good rule to
rower vested in

the confidence reposed in

fo

the
her.

and failed to execute the trust.
The modern cases,
would treat
can it

this

especially

the Tew York Courts,

devise as an absolute gift to the wife;

be doubted that

the disposition

of the

case by

Lord Hardwicke -ras more strictly in accordance with the
intention of the testator ?
Again in

1782,

Lord Chancellor Thurlow,

in

consid-

21
ering the case of I-Iarlan vs. Trigrc,

(I Brolwn, 112) said

"But whenever there are annexed to such words

precise

and direct objects, the law has connected the whole together and held the words sufficient to raise a trust-but then the objects must be distinct".

Here we have

the two testing elements which are universally applied
in the modern cases, to wit :

a certain subject and a

certain object.
In all the modern English and American cases, the
doctrine 'as failed, not because of a repudiation of the
doctrine itself, but because of a failure of the cases
to bear the test of certainty of subject and object,
applying the same rule as in Harlan v. Trigg, (supra)-Spooner vs.Lovejoy, 108 1ass. 572. L Metcalf, "rhipple v.
Arnold, ib. - In Re Adams, etc.,

322.

27 Chan. Div.,

7Aissouri Bank v. Raynor, 7 App. cases, 3?1, Gilbert v.
Chapin, 19 Conn. 346.
Pa. state, 203.
Smith, 3 Braf.
z64.

Matter of Pennock's estate, 20

Foose v. Whitmore, N. Y.,
Surr. 95.

P'es. Ch v. Pisbrow,

v. Cook, 104 N. Y.,

'r1ilde

v.

Campbell v. Beaumont, 91 N.Y. !
52 Pa. state, 49.

Lawrence

632.

The case of Gilbert v. Chapin,

(supra) is frequent-

ly ci ed asoverrulit the doctrine of nrecatory trusts

?2

but

"The

In the o inion the Court said

does not.

it

case which we are not considering does not require r(f

is

a repudiation of the doctrine of recommendatory tr~ists
nor do we say that we would not sup-ort them in cases
wherein the language of recormnendation or desire very
clearly

imnorts a fixed and im-Perati -e rur--ose",

two of the judges dissented from this oninion.
in

Waite

his dissentins,

orinion said

:

and
Judge

"Whatever dis-

position some judges have manifested to limit the operation of the rule, no one could be found who at the present day, would -resume to set it aside or refuse to apply it

In a case falling clearly within the rule."
"It

Again he says :

is better, far better, that a rule

long est iblished and often recognized, should stand antil abrogated by the legislature than that

it

should be

made to change with the ch'anging orinions of judges,
,,hose business

it

is

to apply the law as they find it,

and not as they wo1ld make

it

were

they clothed with the

requisite power. "
In the case of Lawrence v. Cook, the testator by
one clause of his will gave all his pronerty absolutely
to his daughter.

H- a

subsequent

clause he rrovided

:

"I

23
cornxit

grand-daughter

v

to the charge

and guardiansli'i

of my daug1iter, in whose honesty, good will and integritv
I repose the utmost confidence.

I enjoin u-on her to

make such provision for my s-id -,rand-daughter out of ,,iy
estate, in sach manner, at

such times and in such amounts

as she may judge to be expedient and conducive to the
welfare of said

rand-child and her own se se of justice

and christian duty shall dictate."

Lawrence J.,

Special Term, held there was no trust

at

; the General Term

reversed this de-ision, but the Court of A peals reversed the order at General Term and affirmed the S'p'l teridecision, holding that the provision giving the daugh'ter
the right to provide "in

such Pmounts

as she might deem expedient"

nd :t such times

.ras too indefinite, and

vested a discretionary nower in the devisee which the
Court refused to perform.

It

is submitted that upon

principles of equity and sound legal policy, the opinion
of the General Term in this case is the better.
the wor

It held

"enjoin" so imperious as to distinguish the

case from all reported cases, and sufficient to take it
out of the

-eneral rule that an absolute disposition of

property cannot be affected byi

Th:bsequent words of less

24
imperative meaning.

Can it be doubted that this testa-

tor's wishes were violated by the unscruulousness of
the daughter aided by the arbitrary will of the Court ?
Can a nerson with ordinary corfrion sense read the words of
the testator,

and then say it

was his intention that the

grand-daughter should derive no benefits from his will ?
Had the Court held a trust created; made such provision
for the child as would be "conducive to the welfare of
said grand-daughter" and such as

"

a sense of justice an-

and christian duty shall dictate", as in Harding vs. Glyn;
would not this have been more in accordance with the
manifest

intention of the testator ?

In Paul v. Compton, 8 Vesey, 375, Lord Eldon laid
down the rule thus :-

"The

cases

upon words of recom-

mendation have, I take it, now settled upon this rule :
whether the terms aie those of recorrmendation,

or preca-

tory, or expressing horg, or that the testator has no
doubt, if the objects with regard to whom such terms are
used are certain, and the subjects of rroperty to be
given are also certain, the words are considered imperative;

and create a trust.

But the questions are very

different whether the words of a will create a trust or
a rower.

If the words are ipmerative, they do not ore-

25
ate a power;

but they execute themselves by force of the

t erms.
To analyze this statement,

it will be

seen that

thequestion is, not what words in themselves are imperacertain conditions existing, will

tive, but what words,

7rom this

be held to be imperative, by rresumption.

position the New York and other courts seem to have
toward holding that the words must be in

drifted

primary signification, be imrerative
s-umino them
Foose v.

instead of pre-

The rule is thus stated in

imperative.

Whitmore,

their

a leading New York case

8

;-

"The real question is always, whether the wish or desire,
or reconmendation that is expressed by the testator
is meant to govern the

conduct of tie party to whom it

is addressed, or whether it is merely an indication of
that which he thinks would be a reasonable exercise of
the discretion of the party, leavin7 it,

however, to

the party to exercise his own discretion."
Notwithstanding the fierce condemnation of the
rule

from many sources, it is given full recognition in

many states at the present day :

Knox v. Knox 48 A.R.

487 (Wis.).Bispham on Equity, Sec. 72. and in England,
Le Merchant

v.

same.

18 L.

R.

Eq.

cases,

414.

26

the

In Warner v. Bates, 98 Mass.,

276,

Court contained the followino,:

"Te

the opinion of
see no suffi-

cient ground for calling in question t-e w-isdom or policy of the rule of construction uniformly apnlied to
wills in Courts of England and most of the United States,
that words of entreaty, recommendation or Wish, addressed by a testator to a devisee or legatee, will
make him a trustee for the persons in whose favor such
expressions are used, proviled the testator has pointed
out with clearness and certainty the objects of the
trust and subject matter.

Indeed, we cannot

muderstand

the force or validity of the objections urp':ed against
if care is taken to keep it

in subordination to the

mary and cardinal rule that the

it

-ri-

intent of the testator

is to govern, and apply it only where the creation of
a trust will only subserve that

intent."

In that case

a widow gave her second husband certain property "In the
full confidence that he will, as he has heretofore done,
continue to give and afford such protection
to my children

and support

as they may stand in need of.' Held, a

trust for the children.
Mr. Bispham in his work on Equity Jurisprudence,
says the

doctrine of recommnendatory trusts as laid down

in Warner v. Bates exists in all the United States
(Bispham, section 72).
Judge Lowrie, in the case discussed supra, says:
"We may now add that we know of no American case where
the antiquated Englis'
diametrically

rifle has been adopted."

opposed opinions

wide difference existin2 as

fairly

These

demonstrate the

to the present state of the

doctrine.
Our analysis of this subject was b-sed upon the
hypothesis that the doctrine of construing wills according to the intention of the testator is a part of the
settled law of England and America.

A defense of that

maxim is beyond the scope of this paper.

Indeed, if re-

peated judicial decisions of more than two centuries
are to be received as

the best

evidence of what the law

is, the question will not admit of argument.
From our review of this subject, we submit the
question whether the doctrine of precatory trusts does
not exist as fully to-day as a century ago;
just,
originally

humane and sound legal principle
founded does not still

whether the

on which it

was

remain to su-port it,

and whether the alleged tendency to drift away from it
is not really a drifting away from the doctrine that

28
wills

should be construed according to the intentions

of the testator ?
If

a doctrine,

decisions

in

nurtured and sanctioned by judicial

every part of the universe

two centuries,

for upward of

is to be repudiated and that,

too,

without legislative sanction, we say let the Courts

frankly assume the responsibility,

anrd not attempt to

shield their acts behind a more ropular but equally

effectual reason for its

overthrow.

